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Introduction	
	August	9,	2007	is	often	regarded	as	the	starting	date	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	BNP	Paribas	stopped	trading	in	three	of	its	investment	funds	exposed	to	the	U.S.	sub-prime	mortgage	markets	as	the	liquidity	in	these	markets	had	all	but	dried	up.		Liquidity	considerations	are	a	symptom	of	the	supply	side	of	funds:	the	lenders’	side.	The	 latter	 could	be	banks,	hedge	 funds,	 asset	managers	or	pension	 funds,	but	equally	rich	individuals	who	would	invest	directly	in	these	markets.		The	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008	 was	 a	 lenders’	 crisis.	 Generally,	 banks	 had	insufficient	capital	to	absorb	the	losses	created	by	the	reduced	liquidity	levels	in	the	financial	markets.	Central	banks	had	to	step	in	to	rescue	quite	a	few	of	them.		The	 fact	 was,	 however,	 that	 the	 underlying	 cause	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 was	 a	borrowers’	 crisis.	 In	 the	 U.S.,	 over	 the	 years	 1997-2007,	 households	 had	 to	borrow	an	ever-growing	percentage	of	their	earnings	in	order	to	get	themselves	on	 the	property	 ladder	or	 rent	 a	home.	Long	before	2007,	 in	 fact	by	2003,	 the	additional	amount	that	a	household	had	to	borrow	to	get	a	home	was	equal	to	a	full	year	of	earnings.	Average	income	growth	and	mortgage	volume	growth	were	on	a	collision	course.	Borrowers	had	to	allocate	 increasing	percentages	of	their	earnings	to	servicing	mortgage	debts	or	renting	a	home.		The	notion	that	lenders	will	rein	in	their	lending	as	a	consequence	of	free	market	competition	 is	 a	 fallacy.	 The	 key	 is	 not	 the	 price	 of	 funds	 borrowed,	 but	 the	volume	 of	 funds	 lend	 per	 time	 period	 in	 comparison	 to	 average	 household’	nominal	income	growth.		The	consequences	of	a	borrowers’	crisis	are	different	 from	a	 financial	markets’	liquidity	 one.	 When	 households	 have	 to	 allocate	 an	 increasing	 share	 of	 their	income	to	either	buy	or	rent	a	home,	fewer	funds	are	available	to	spend	on	other	goods	 and	 services.	 When	 households	 are	 subsequently	 confronted	 with	foreclosure	 and	 ultimately	 repossession	 of	 homes,	 they	 lose	 most	 or	 all	 past	savings	accumulated	in	the	home.	The	poor	get	poorer,	both	in	income	and	asset	values	terms.	The	gap	between	the	haves	and	the	have-nots	widens	dramatically.		Volume	of	 lending	control	and	 to	some	extent	rent	controls	can	prevent	a	new	financial	crisis	occurring.	More	measures	are	needed	to	overcome	a	borrowers’	crisis.							
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1.	The	income-house	price	gap	in	the	U.S.	over	the	period	1996-2016	
		A	borrowers’	 crisis	does	not	develop	overnight,	 but	may	 take	a	number	of	 years	before	the	storm	signals	need	to	be	raised.	Over	the	period	1996-2007	such	storm	signals	 were	 ignored.	 As	 table	 1,	 below,	 indicates:	 in	 2003	 the	 median	 nominal	household	 income	 in	 the	 U.S.	 could	 afford	 a	 house	 price	 of	 $203,089.	 Such	affordability	 level	 indicates	 that	 income	 available	 for	 other	 goods	 and	 services	grows	equally	with	 the	 increase	 in	 such	household	 income:	 there	 is	 therefore	no	forced	shift	in	the	spending	pattern.	In	2003,	the	actual	average	home	sales	price	in	the	 U.S	 was	 $246,300.	 On	 average	 each	 household	 entering	 the	 home	 market	would	need	to	borrow	an	additional	$43,211	to	acquire	a	home.	Such	amount	was	equal	to	a	year’s	average	income	in	2003.	What	should	also	be	considered	is	that	median	income	households	cannot	spend	100%	of	their	income	on	debt	servicing.	They	usually	spend	around	40%	on	housing	costs.	If	so,	the	$43,211	should	be	seen	in	 this	 context.	 It	 translates	 in	 2.5	 times	 the	 $43,211	or	 $108,000	 in	 future	debt	commitments.		How	new	home	buyers	were	affected,	differed	from	year	to	year.	The	lucky	buyers	were	 the	ones	who	had	 the	opportunity	 to	buy	a	home	 in	1997	and	1998.	From	1999	on,	the	gap	between	the	average	home	sales	price	and	the	affordability	price,	based	on	nominal	average	 income	levels,	started	to	deviate.	The	money	allocated	to	mortgage	lending	over	the	period	1999-2003	doubled	from	$524	billion	in	1999	to	$1.112	trillion	by	2003.	Such	increased	lending	levels	had	a	somewhat	positive	effect	on	the	volume	of	new	housing	starts,	especially	 for	2003;	however	most	of	the	 increased	 lending	 influenced	 the	 average	 home	 sales	 price	 over	 the	 period	1999-2003.		This	excess	in	funding	resulted	in	a	situation	that	by	1999	the	average	home	sales	price	in	the	U.S.	was	2.5%	over	the	income	based	affordability	home	price.	By	2000	the	percentage	had	increased	to	5.15%,	to	be	followed	in	2001	to	7.22%,	a	further	increase	followed	in	2002	to	15.02%	and	the	percentage	reached	21.27%	by	2003.	As	no	action	was	taken	to	stem	this	rapid	increase	in	the	volume	of	lending,	actual	home	prices	moved	up	faster	than	the	income	affordability	ones;	by	2007	this	gap	had	grown	to	33.1%.	This	meant	that	by	2007,	on	average,	an	extra	amount	had	to	be	borrowed	of	over	1.5	 times	the	median	household	nominal	annual	 income	for	each	new	homeowner.	It	also	meant	that	average	rental	prices	went	up,	so	that	a	large	 number	 of	 households	 were	 forced	 to	 allocate	 a	 disproportionate	 level	 of	their	income	to	either	buying	or	renting	a	place.		The	 income-house	price	gap	did	not	and	does	not	develop	overnight.	 It	also	does	not	affect	all	borrowers	in	the	same	way.	Early	borrowers,	those	who	entered	into	a	 mortgage	 commitment	 in	 1996-1997,	 were	 much	 better	 off	 than	 those	 who	entered	between	2003-2007.	Households,	who	owned	their	homes	outright,	were	even	less	affected	in	their	spending	power	out	of	current	incomes.		
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																																																																																															Economic	sense	to	help	have-nots	in	a	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	real	threat	to	the	U.S.	economy	originated	from	the	gradual	shift	in	disposable	income	 levels	 for	 individual	 households,	 after	 the	 impact	 of	 increasing	 costs	 of	mortgages	were	taken	into	account	relative	to	incomes	earned.	This	threat	is	based	on	 the	 limits	 in	 the	earning	capacity	of	 each	 individual	household.	No	household	can	force	an	employer	to	pay	more	for	their	services.	As	incomes	experience	limits	set	by	the	labor	markets,	expenses	for	mortgage	or	renting	purposes	will	also	need	to	 fall	 in	 line	 with	 such	 income	 growth,	 otherwise	 real	 consumption	 levels	 will	drop	 and	 more	 and	 more	 borrowers	 will	 experience	 debt	 servicing	 problems.	Ultimately	economic	growth	will	slow	down	or	–in	the	worst	case	scenario	like	in	2008-	will	collapse.			Table	1,	below,	illustrates	the	cliff	end	results	of	the	mortgage-lending	boom	over	the	 period	 1996-2008,	 with	 the	 cliff	 being	 passed	 in	 2008.	 Nominal	 mortgage	lending	levels	in	2016	are	still	below	the	2001	levels.	New	housing	starts	in	2016	were	 still	 below	 the	 1996	 levels,	 some	 20	 years	 earlier.	 Unemployment	 rates	doubled	 from	 5%	 to	 10%	 over	 the	 18	months	 from	 early	 2008.	 It	 took	 to	 April	2016	to	get	back	to	the	5%	level	again.	Equally	bad	was	the	impact	the	crisis	had	on	real	household	median	incomes.	According	to	Sentier	Research,	the	real	median	household	income	in	the	U.S.	reached	$59,190	in	January	2008.	After	a	substantial	drop	in	the	years	to	2017,	it	now	stands	at	$59,345	as	in	May	2017.	For	nine	years	there	has	been	no	growth	in	real	incomes.		Perhaps	 the	 time	has	 come	 to	 consider	how	a	borrowers’	 crisis	 can	be	 resolved,	rather	than	saving	the	banking	sector.		
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Table	1:	The	developments	of	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending,	the	annual	housing	starts,	the	average	U.S.	home	sales	price,	the	nominal	median	income	of	households	and	U.S.	home	sale	prices	based	on	such	incomes					
	
Year	
	
									1	
Volume	of	
Home	mortgage	
Lending	
X	U.S.$	billion	
	
						2	
Annual	
Housing	starts	
X	thousands	
							3	
Average	U.S.	
Home	sales	
price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
					4	
Median	
Household	
Nominal	
Income	
X	U.S.	dollars	
							5	
Income	
Affordability	
House	price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
1996	 				329	 1370	 166,400	 35,492	 	
1997	 			341	 1566	 176,200	 37,005	 173,494	
1998	 			437	 1792	 181,900	 38,885	 182,308	
1999	 				524	 1708	 195,600	 40,696	 190,798	
2000	 			544	 1532	 207,000	 41,990	 196,864	
2001	 			685	 1568	 213,200	 42,228	 197,980	
2002	 			907	 1788	 228,700	 42,409	 198,828	
2003	 	1112	 2057	 246,300	 43,318	 203,089	
2004	 	1211	 2042	 274,500	 44,334	 207,852	
2005	 	1351	 1994	 297,000	 46,326	 217,233	
2006	 	1327	 1649	 305,900	 48,201	 226,025	
2007	 	1057	 1037	 313,600	 50,233	 235,553	
2008	 			319	 		560	 292,600	 50,303	 235,881	
2009	 			186	 		581	 270,900	 49,777	 233,414	
2010	 	-167	 		539	 272,900	 49,276	 231,065	
2011	 			104	 		694	 263,400	 50,054	 234,713	
2012	 			105	 		976	 285,400	 51,017	 239,229	
2013	 				223	 1010	 319,300	 53,585	 251,271	
2014	 				312	 1081	 312,500	 53,657	 251,609	
2015	 				407	 1160	 352,500	 55,775	 261,541	
2016	 				596	 1226	 384,000	 	 				
	
2.	The	implications	of	an	income-house	price	gap	
	The	fact	that,	by	2007	as	compared	to	1997,	a	household	had	to	borrow	an	extra	amount	 of	 1.5	 years	 average	 nominal	 income,	 just	 to	 afford	 to	 buy	 a	 home,	implies	that	an	income	gap	was	created	between	the	1997	buyers	and	the	2007	ones.	The	2007	buyers,	but	also	the	buyers	from	1999	to	2007,	were	the	victims	of	 the	unfettered	 increase	 in	mortgage	 lending.	Each	of	 these	 latter	buyers	was	made	worse	 off	 than	 the	1997	buyers	 and	 those	before	 them.	They,	 the	1999-2007	buyers,	had	to	take	on	a	mortgage	amount	that	represented	a	considerable	higher	 percentage	 of	 their	 nominal	 income	 than	 the	 1997	 and	 previous	generations.	 The	 nominal	 income	 amount	 can	 only	 be	 spend	 once	 and	 if	more	funds	 need	 to	 be	 allocated	 to	 a	 relatively	 higher	 mortgage	 amount	 or	 higher	rents,	 the	 result	will	 be	 that	 less	 is	 available	 for	 spending	 on	 other	 goods	 and	services.	 Such	 a	 shift	 in	 allocation	 represents	 a	 loss	 in	 drivers	 of	 economic	growth,	 but	 equally	 a	 shift	 from	 the	 poorer	 to	 the	 richer	 classes.	 The	 poor	become	poorer	and	the	rich	relatively	richer,	just	as	an	effect	of	excess	lending.		
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																																																											Economic	sense	to	help	have-nots	in	a	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		There	is	no	doubt	that	a	borrowers’	crisis	leads	to	a	lenders’	crisis.	If	a	sufficient	number	of	households	cannot	afford	to	repay	the	loans	that	have	been	granted	to	them,	the	lenders	will	have	to	absorb	the	losses.	Such	lenders	could	be	holders	of	mortgage-backed	 securities,	 banks,	 pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies,	 hedge	funds	and	investors	in	mutual	funds	or	wealthy	individuals.			It	has	been	clear	from	the	statistics	of	foreclosures	and	repossessions	in	the	U.S.	that	 all	 these	 fund	 providers	will	 do	 everything	 in	 their	 legal	 powers	 to	 force	borrowers	 to	pay	up	 the	maximum	 they	 can	or,	 in	 case	 they	 cannot,	 take	over	their	property	through	repossession	procedures.		What	is	also	clear	is	that	there	can	be	different	solutions	to	solve	a	debtors’	crisis,	especially	one	that	is	caused	by	the	lenders	collectively,	rather	than	wait	for	the	lenders	to	take	legal	actions	that	multiply	the	effects	of	such	excessive	lending.		
3.	The	lenders’	crisis	“solutions”	
	The	 2008	 financial	 crisis	 in	 the	 U.S.	 laid	 bare	 a	 number	 of	 weaknesses	 in	 the	structure	and	organization	of	the	financial	system.			U.S.	 banking	 supervision	 was	 spread	 over	 several	 agencies	 preventing	 a	coordinated	approach	to	action	taking.		Big	banks	and	insurance	companies	regarded	themselves	as	“too	big	to	fail”	and	expected	 government	 cash	 injections	 in	 case	 doubtful	 debtors	 exceeded	 their	capital	 levels.	 Their	mix	 of	 commercial	 and	 investment	 banking	 activities	 -the	latter	 including	 own	 risk	 positions	 taking,	 which	 was	 regarded	 by	 many	 as	authorized	gambling-	did	 create	 losses	not	only	on	ordinary	 loans,	 but	 also	on	many	synthetic	products	barely	understood	by	outsiders.		The	 big	U.S.	 investment	 banks	 had	 taken	 advantage	 of	 the	 fast	 increase	 in	 the	volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	 over	 the	 period	 2001-2007.	 Especially	 from	2004	these	 brokerage	 houses	 created	 synthetic	 products	 that	 could	 be	 sold	 to	investors	around	 the	world.	Many	 included	sub-prime	mortgage	 loans.	The	big	brokerage	houses	 took	on	 enormous	debts;	 so	much	 so	 that	 its	 debt	 to	 capital	ratios	had	deteriorated	to	32	to	1	by	20071.	Any	failure	of	each	of	these	brokers	could	lead	to	a	liquidity	crisis,	which	it	did	by	August	2008.		Credit	 rating	 agencies	 did	 clearly	 fail	 in	 their	 duties	 to	 protect	 investors	 from	excessive	risk	 taking,	as	many	 investment	products	had	an	AA	or	 triple	A	 level	ratings	attached	to	them,	which	turned	out	to	be	erroneous.		The	 Federal	 Reserve	 in	 coordination	with	 the	 U.S.	 Treasury	 took	 a	 number	 of	steps	to	countenance	the	impending	financial	crisis.																																																											1https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/133337/too-big-to-fail/	
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																																																																																																																			Economic	sense	to	help	have-nots	in	a	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		In	November	2008,	Quantitative	Easing	–the	action	of	buying	up	of	U.S.	Treasury	bonds	 and	Mortgage	Backed	 Securities-	 started.	 	 In	 total	 $4.2	 trillion	 of	 bonds	were	 bought	 up	 over	 a	 period	 of	 three	 years,	 split	 over	 $2.8	 trillion	 Treasury	bonds	and	$1.4	trillion	mortgage	backed	bonds.		On	the	date	of	writing	this	paper	–August	2017-,	the	$4.2	trillion	were	still	on	the	books	of	the	Fed.		The	second	step	was	a	lowering	of	the	effective	Funds	rate	by	the	Fed.	Over	the	year	2008	the	rate	was	lowered	from	3.94%	in	January	2008	to	0.15%	in	January	2009.		The	 third	 step	 was	 to	 create	 a	 better	 legislation	 to	 address	 some	 of	 the	weaknesses	in	managing	the	financial	system.	The	Dodd-Frank	act	was	enacted	in	July	2010.	Banks	were	forced	to	improve	their	debt	to	equity	ratios.		In	 2008	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 but	 also	 in	 other	 countries	 like	 the	 U.K.,	 the	 financial	authorities	gave	maximum	attention	to	stabilizing	the	financial	sector,	especially	focusing	on	the	banking	sector	and	some	insurance	companies.			
	
The	pre-crisis	interest	rate	policies.	
	The	U.S.	financial	authorities	always	considered	that	a	volume	of	lending	excess	could	be	rectified	by	an	interest	rate	correction.	Table	2	reflects	the	effective	Fed	funds	rate	over	the	period	January	1996-January	20092.		
	
Table	2:	Effective	Fed	funds	rate	January	1996-	January	2009			
Date	 Effective	
Fed	funds	rate	%	
Date	 Effective	
Fed	funds	rate	%	January	1996	 5.56	 January	2003	 1.24	January	1997	 5.25	 January	2004	 1.00	January	1998	 5.56	 January	2005	 2.28	January	1999	 4.63	 January	2006	 4.29	January	2000	 5.45	 January	2007	 5.25	January	2001	 5.98	 January	2008	 3.94	January	2002	 1.73	 January	2009	 0.15			The	conclusion	out	of	 table	1	and	 table	2	 combined	 is	 that	 the	 lowering	of	 the	base	rate	from	5.98%	by	January	2001	to	1.73%	by	January	2002	had	certainly	the	effect	of	increasing	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	from	$685	billion	in	2001	to	$907	billion	in	2002	and	$1.112	trillion	in	2003.	However,	what	was	not	fully																																																										2	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS	
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																																																																																																																																																																																							Economic	sense	to	help	have-nots	in	a	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		appreciated	 at	 the	 time,	 was	 that	 lowering	 the	 interest	 rate	 had	 a	 substantial	price	 effect	 on	 house	 prices.	 As	 table	 1	 indicates,	 it	 encouraged	 average	 home	sales	 prices	 to	 increase	 faster	 than	 the	 income	 affordability	 house	 prices.	 This	trend,	 which	 started	 in	 1999	 and	 followed	 slowly	 through	 2000	 and	 2001,	accelerated	strongly	in	2002	and	2003.			In	 2002	 and	 2003,	 the	 act	 to	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 by	 lowering	 interest	rates	 simultaneously	 undermined	 the	 capacity	 of	 new	 home	 owners	 and	 rent	paying	households	to	maintain	their	spending	levels	out	of	current	incomes.	This	negative	 effect	 on	 household	 income	 levels	 was	 an	 immediate	 result	 of	 the	volume	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 exceeding	 the	 capacity	 of	 households	 to	 increase	their	nominal	incomes.		Neither	 in	2003,	nor	 in	 later	years	to	2008,	was	a	policy	 introduced	to	restrain	lenders	to	reduce	the	growth	in	home	mortgage	volumes	to	within	the	limits	of	the	nominal	 income	growth	 levels	of	U.S.	households.	By	2007-2008,	many	U.S	households	were	confronted	with	a	liquidity	crisis	as	a	result	of	their	mortgage	borrowings.	This	was	not	a	result	of	their	own	making,	but	a	direct	consequence	of	 the	 volume	 of	 mortgage	 lending	 that	 far	 exceeded	 the	 growth	 in	 median	nominal	 household	 incomes.	 Excessive	 lending	 volumes	 did	 destruct	 economic	growth	levels.			
Some	observations	about	the	solutions	to	the	lenders’	crisis.	
	In	 the	 pre-crisis	 situation,	 before	 2008,	 the	 price	 of	 money	 was	 substantially	lowered	 from	 5.98%	 in	 January	 2001	 to	 1.73%	 by	 January	 2002.	 This	 price	lowering	 had	 a	 strong	 effect	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 mortgage	 funds	 supplied	 to	individual	 households.	 The	 latter	 expanded	 by	 34.5%	 in	 a	 single	 year	 in	 2002	over	2001.	In	2003	the	growth	rate	was	even	higher	at	62.3%	over	2001	levels	and	 for	 2004-2007	 such	 expansion	 was	 even	 higher	 as	 compared	 to	 2001.	Between	2001	and	2007	the	U.S.	nominal	median	income	levels	grew	by	18.95%.	Over	the	period	2001-2007,	the	volume	of	new	mortgage	funds	supplied	to	U.S.	households	overwhelmed,	by	a	very	large	margin,	the	income	growth	figures.		To	 illustrate	 this	 diverging	 gap	with	 some	different	 figures:	 in	 2001	 the	 actual	house	 price	was	 $15,220	 higher	 than	 the	 affordable	 house	 price	 for	 a	median	income	household.		The	$15,220	represented	36%	of	the	annual	median	income	in	 2001.	 By	 2007	 the	 actual	 house	 price	was	 $78,042	 higher	 than	 the	 income	affordable	 one.	 This	 represented	155%	of	 the	nominal	median	 income	 level	 in	2007.	In	2007	the	average	mortgage	borrower	had	to	take	out	an	extra	mortgage	volume	of	more	than	1.5	times	his	median	annual	nominal	income	compared	to	home	 mortgage	 borrowers	 in	 1997.	 Such	 extra	 debt	 position	 (or	 rental	 one)	meant	 that	 the	 house	 price	 inflation	 levels	 –supported	 by	 low	 interest	 rates-	weakened	the	financial	position	of	each	and	every	household	at	or	below	the		
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																																																															 Economic sense to help have-nots in a financial crisis©Drs Kees De Koning		median	income	level	that	did	buy	a	home	over	the	period	2001-2007.	More	debt	than	needed	made	the	poor	poorer.		No	preventive	action	was	 taken	 to	 slow	down	 the	volume	of	mortgage	 lending	over	the	period	2001-2007.	The	poor	became	poorer.																																																																																						
4.	Some	ideas	about	how	to	solve	a	borrowers’	crisis	
	Is	it	not	ironical	that	the	two	major	solutions	to	the	lenders’	crisis:	Quantitative	easing	 and	 a	 further	 lowering	 of	 interest	 rates	 did	 so	 little	 for	 the	 median	nominal	income	households	lucky	enough	to	remain	in	a	job	after	2008.	In	2008	this	income	level	was	$50,303	and	only	by	2012	did	it	exceed	the	2008	level	to	$51,017.			With	 the	 lowest	 interest	 rate	 on	 record	 at	 0.15	%,	U.S.	 households	 collectively	reduced	 their	 outstanding	 mortgage	 lending	 level	 by	 well	 over	 10%	 over	 the	period	2008-2015	or	in	actual	amounts	by	$1.24	trillion	from	the	high	of	$10.712	trillion	over	the	period	Quarter	1	2008	to	$9.471	trillion	over	Quarter	2	2015.		U.S.	 households	 that	 fell	 into	 payment	 arrears	were	 pursued	 through	 the	 legal	system.	It	 is	 important	to	mention	that	a	 legal	system	can	replace	economically	sensible	measures.	This	was	made	clear	in	the	latest	financial	stability	report	of	the	Bank	of	England.		The	Bank	of	England	in	its	latest	2017	Financial	Stability	Report3	has	developed	a	 diagram	 of	 a	 “self-reinforcing	 feed	 back	 loop”.	 It	 shows	 the	 potential	relationship	between	an	adverse	house	price	fall,	its	collateral	effect,	the	reaction	of	 the	 banking	 community	 in	 reducing	 the	 supply	 of	 credit,	 the	 expectation	 of	further	house	price	drops	and	 “fire	 sales”	and	 the	 reinforcement	of	an	adverse	house	price	shock.		
																																																								3	http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2017/jun.aspx		
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																																																																																															The	Bank	of	England’s	report	expresses	a	fear	that	the	“self-reinforcing	feedback	loop”	can	be	the	cause	of	a	next	financial	crisis.	It	is	recommending	steps	to	force	banks	to	increase	their	capital	buffers	against	such	adverse	events.		The	situation	in	the	U.K.	differs	 in	one	major	aspect	from	that	 in	the	U.S.	 In	the	U.K.,	for	many	years,	not	enough	new	homes	were	built	to	satisfy	the	needs	of	the	growing	population.	Such	undersupply	creates	an	artificial	scarcity	effect,	which	pushes	house	prices	up	far	in	excess	of	average	income	growth.	In	the	U.S.,	over	the	period	 from	1997-2007,	 the	volume	of	new	housing	starts	was	well	 in	 line	with	the	population	growth	over	that	period,	but	the	growth	in	mortgage	lending	far	exceeded	the	average	growth	in	incomes.		In	the	U.S.	the	first	adverse	shock	came	from	the	number	of	households	unable	to	continue	 to	 service	 their	mortgage	 debt	 by	 2007-2008.	 The	 legal	 system	 took	over	through	foreclosure	proceedings	and	repossessions.		Just	to	show	the	evidence,	in	table	3	an	overview	is	provided	of	U.S.	foreclosure	proceedings	started,	completed	and	repossessions.		
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Table	 3:	 Foreclosure	 filings,	 foreclosures	 and	 home	 repossessions	 in	 the	
U.S.	2004-2016		
Year							Foreclosure						Completed												Home		
																Filings																Foreclosures								Repossessions			2016	 					956,864	 								427,997	 														203,108	2015	 		1,083,572	 								569.825	 														449,900	2014	 		1,117,426	 								575,378	 														327,069	2013	 		1,369,405	 								921,064	 														463,108	2012	 		2,300,000	 					2,100,000	 														700,000	2011	 		3,920,418	 					3,580,000	 											1,147,000	2010	 		3,843,548	 					3,500,000	 											1,125,000	2009	 		3,457,643	 					2,920,000	 														945,000	2008	 		3,019,482	 					2,350,000	 														679,000	2007	 		2,203,295	 					1,260,000	 														489,000	2006	 		1,566,398	 								973,000	 														356,000	2005	 		1,126,637	 								773,000	 														312,000	2004	 					948,031	 								582,000	 														274,000		 	
	The	 table	 shows	 clearly	 that	 already	 by	 2006	 over	 1.5	million	 households	 got	into	financial	difficulties	due	to	mortgage	borrowings,	a	65%	increase	over	2004.	Over	 the	 period	 2006-2014	 22.9	 million	 households	 were	 confronted	 with	foreclosure	filings.	Over	the	same	period	6.2	million	homes	were	repossessed.	Is	it	 any	 surprise	 that	over	 the	period	2007-2016	new	housing	 starts	dropped	of	the	scale?	
	
The	magic	question	
	Could	 the	 borrowers’	 crisis	 have	 been	 avoided?	 The	 answer	 is	 a	 definite	 yes.	Restraining	mortgage-lending	 levels,	when	 their	 growth	 exceeds	 the	 growth	 in	median	 incomes	 would	 be	 a	 start.	 Comparing	 income	 growth	 levels	 with	mortgage	 lending	 levels	 is	 not	 rocket	 science.	 However,	 no	 specific	 mortgage	lending	control	measures	were	taken	over	the	period	2001-2008.	The	common	opinion	was	 that	 interest	rate	movements	would	help	 to	control	 the	volume	of	lending.	 The	 common	 failure	 was	 not	 to	 spot	 and	 act	 upon	 the	 danger	 to	household	 finances	 that	 was	 caused	 by	 actual	 house	 prices	 rising	 faster	 than	income	growth	levels.		The	 second	 main	 question	 is:	 Could	 the	 adjustment	 period	 have	 been	 better	handled.	My	answer	is	a	definite	yes.		It	 is	 a	 system	 error	 to	 rely	 upon	 the	 legal	 system	 to	 sort	 out	 an	 economic	malfunction.	 The	 system	 error	 was	 that	 over	 the	 period	 2002-2008,	 U.S.	households	had	to	dedicate	an	ever-increasing	percentage	of	their	incomes	to		
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																																																																																									Economic	sense	to	help	have-nots	in	a	financial	crisis©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		servicing	mortgage	debts	 or	 pay	 higher	 rents.	 This	 should	not	 have	 happened.	However	it	did.	The	debt	recovery	process	did	not	use	economic	means	to	solve	the	 crisis,	 but	 legal	 means	 of	 foreclosure	 filings,	 completed	 foreclosures	 and	home	 repossessions.	 The	Bank	of	 England’s	 feedback	 loop	worked	perfectly	 in	this	 way,	 to	 the	 great	 detriment	 of	 individual	 households.	 With	 falling	 house	prices,	 households	 had	 even	 less	 of	 a	 chance	 of	 any	 recovery	 of	 accumulated	savings	in	the	home.	The	poor	were	forced	into	deeper	poverty.	As	stated	above,	this	was	not	due	to	a	fault	of	their	own	making.		There	 is	 another	 option,	 an	 economic	 one	 and	 one	 actually	 quite	 similar	 to	providing	liquidity	to	the	banking	sector,	when	it	ran	into	financial	problems.	It	can	be	described	as	a	liquidity	support	system	for	individual	households.	In	 a	 previous	 paper:	 “How	 the	 financial	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	 averted”4,	 the	writer	already	illustrated	such	suggestion.	The	option	could	be	used	when	a	cap	on	mortgage-lending	levels	had	not	been	enforced.	In	such	case	the	setting	up	of	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	was	recommended	to	help	households	overcome	their	liquidity	squeeze.	Such	an	NMB	could	act	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	individual	households	on	basis	of	sharing	part	of	the	asset	(the	home)	with	the	NMB	for	its	cash-flow	help.	Such	help	should	be	differentiated	for	each	income	class	that	an	individual	household	belongs	to.	Low-income	earners	should	be	helped	most.	It	is	ironical	that,	in	1936,	the	U.S.	Home	Owners	Loan	Corporation	was	disbanded.	Had	 such	 a	 Corporation	 been	 in	 existence	 in	 2007-2008,	 it	 could	 have	 done	wonders	 for	 maintaining	 the	 liquidity	 position	 for	 most	 mortgagors	 and	 even	take	 a	 subordinated	 share	 in	 the	 housing	market,	 till	 mortgage	 lending	 levels	were	 better	 attuned	 to	 the	 nominal	 increases	 in	 median	 household	 incomes.	Rather	than	buying	up	mortgage	backed	securities	to	the	tune	of	$1.8	trillion,	as	was	done,	 an	 assistance	 scheme	 to	directly	help	households	 to	 overcome	 their	liquidity	 pressures	would	 have	 been	 a	much	more	 effective	way	 in	 avoiding	 a	rapid	 increase	 in	unemployment	 levels	and	the	subsequent	 fast	 increase	 in	U.S.	government	debt	levels.	Economic	growth	levels	would	also	have	been	higher.	The	 lenders	 should	 pay	 a	 price	 to	 the	NMB	 for	 the	 reduction	 in	 risks	 that	 the	NMB	manages	for	them.	The	borrowers	should	share	-on	a	subordinated	basis-	with	the	NMB	some	of	the	wealth	incorporated	in	the	homes.	With	 the	help	of	an	NMB,	mortgage	borrowers	can	be	helped	–on	a	 temporary	basis-	 to	 overcome	 the	 economic	 pressures	 that	 the	 excess	 mortgage	 lending	levels	have	created	for	them.	This	solution	 is	an	economic,	 rather	 than	a	 legal	one.	 	Such	solution	avoids	 the	loop	effects	as	spelled	out	by	the	Bank	of	England’s	financial	stability	report.	
																																																									4	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/77060.html	
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The	impact	on	households	If	 economists	 can	 agree	 that	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 financial	 and	 economic	 crisis	 of	2007-2008	 was	 burdening	 households	 with	 more	 mortgage	 debt	 than	 their	income	 growth	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 repay	 -without	 having	 to	 cut	 down	 on	spending	on	other	goods	and	services-,	 then	the	solution	to	solving	or	avoiding	such	 crisis	 in	 future,	 becomes	 clearer.	 A	 direct	 approach	 to	 help	 households	financially	 to	 overcome	 such	 liquidity	 squeeze	 becomes	 more	 rational.	 Such	solution	also	restores	the	balance	between	the	rich	and	poorer	households.	The	lower	 income	households	do	not	 lose	out	due	to	 lending	excesses	organised	by	the	 financial	 sector.	 The	 lenders	 will	 need	 to	 contribute	 to	 an	 NMB	 for	 the	lowering	 of	 their	 risks	 over	 the	mortgage	 portfolio.	 An	NMB,	 once	 it	 has	 been	accepted	 as	 a	 viable	 solution,	will	 reduce	 rather	 than	 increase	 the	 income	 and	wealth	 gap	between	 the	 rich	 and	poor.	 Economic	 growth	 levels	 should	 be	 less	affected	 as	 households	 are	 enabled	 to	 continue	 to	 spend	 on	 other	 goods	 and	services.	 Unemployment	 levels	 would	 not	 have	 doubled	 over	 a	 short	 space	 of	time.	Government	debt	levels	would	not	have	risen	so	rapidly	as	they	did	in	the	U.S.	over	the	last	nine	years.	Last	but	not	least,	an	economic	imperfection	can	be	solved	with	economic	means,	rather	than	with	the	help	of	the	legal	system.		Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood,	U.K.	30	August	2017		
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